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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, debates have raged worldwide 
about the extent to which the human body and its component 
parts should be bought, sold, rented, or donated.1 Gestational 
surrogacy2 in particular has become more popular in recent 
years and, in an increasing number of cases, individuals wishing 
to obtain the services of a surrogate are leaving their own 
countries to do so.3 The subject of surrogacy brings with it a host 
of concerns, including ethical worries over exploitation of 
surrogates in the global marketplace, the increasing potential 
for reproductive tourism as a result of national differences in 
regulation, and the geographic and socioeconomic imbalances 
between providers and purchasers. It is therefore worthwhile to 
examine more thoroughly the need for—and mechanisms for 
creating—international regulation to protect all parties involved 
in international gestational surrogacy.  
This Article expands the global gestational surrogacy 
debate by analyzing surrogacy’s potential as a subject of 
international regulation, particularly under the trade and labor 
frameworks. This Article recognizes that surrogacy’s complexity 
as a legal issue is such that regulation would require a broad-
based instrument that is unlikely to have the necessary political 
will behind it. Further, this Article accepts the premise that 
different legal frameworks are likely to have different impacts on 
the rights and interests of parties,4 and examines the feasibility 
                                                                                                             
1. Examples of such debates include those surrounding the legal status of sex 
work (and its relationship to sex trafficking and human slavery), standards for organ 
and tissue procurement and transplantation (including debates about the feasibility 
and defensibility of nonreproductive organ sales), gamete donation or sale (for both 
reproduction and scientific research), and gestational surrogacy (particularly when the 
surrogate’s identity is unknown to the procurer of the surrogate’s services). 
2. In gestational surrogacy, a surrogate mother carries and births a child that is 
genetically unrelated to her. See Brigitte Clark, Surrogate Motherhood: Comment on the 
South African Law Commission’s Report on Surrogate Motherhood (Project 65), 110 S. 
AFR. L.J. 769, 769 (1993). Some surrogacy arrangements, sometimes called “partial 
surrogacy,” involve the use of the surrogate mother’s egg. See id. at 769–70. This Article, 
however, limits its discussion to gestational surrogacy. 
3. See, e.g., Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: 
International Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 15–16, 
23–27 (2008).  
4. See, e.g., Bartha M. Knoppers, Reproductive Technology and International 
Mechanisms of Protection of the Human Person, 32 MCGILL L.J. 336, 338 (1987) (noting 
that different international instruments adopt different perspectives regarding rights). 
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and effects of regulating surrogacy in a new, narrowly focused 
international instrument under the auspices of either the World 
Trade Organization or the International Labour Organization. 
Ultimately, this Article concludes that, while both platforms and 
legal frameworks face many challenges, the regulation of 
surrogacy in a new instrument under the ILO is an acceptable, if 
still imperfect, alternative to a comprehensive instrument 
introduced through the United Nations General Assembly. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE GLOBAL TRADE IN WOMBS 
Traditionally, surrogacy was sought by infertile heterosexual 
couples, but now is increasingly sought by gay couples, 
particularly men, as a way of having children that are 
biologically related to one parent.5 The concept of surrogacy 
itself is not new; indeed, surrogacy scholars are fond of making 
references to biblical stories of partial surrogacy.6 Transnational 
gestational surrogacy operations are relatively recent 
phenomena, however, and are becoming increasingly common, 
particularly in Eastern Europe,7 India,8 and certain US states.9 
                                                                                                             
Although Knoppers’s article focuses on human genetic material, many of its 
conclusions and arguments are applicable to similar concerns underlying surrogacy. 
See, e.g., A.M. Capron & M.J. Radin, Choosing Family Law over Contract Law as a Paradigm 
for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 37 (1988) (arguing, inter 
alia, that the application of adoption law to children born of surrogacy arrangements 
would protect the interests of the child). 
5. See, e.g., Susan Donaldson James, More Gay Men Choose Surrogacy to Have 
Children, ABC NEWS, Mar. 12, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/OnCall/
story?id=4439567&page=1.  
6. See, e.g., Smerdon, supra note 3, at 16 (citing the Old Testament stories about 
the impregnation of Hagar, Sarah’s maid, by Abraham, and of Bilhah, Rachel’s maid, 
by Jacob); Jennifer Rimm, Comment, Booming Baby Business: Regulating Commercial 
Surrogacy in India, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1429, 1437 (2009). 
7. See Anne Donchin, Reproductive Tourism and the Quest for Global Gender Justice, 24 
BIOETHICS 323, 327 n.19 (2010); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Reproductive Tourism: Equality 
Concerns in the Global Market for Fertility Services, 27 LAW & INEQUALITY 277, 299 (2009). 
8. See, e.g., Donchin, supra note 7, at 327 n.19; Ruby L. Lee, Note, New Trends in 
Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S 
L.J. 275, 276–77, 284 (2009); Amelia Gentleman, India Nurtures Business of Surrogate 
Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A9 (noting that while exact statistics are 
difficult to find, “anecdotal evidence suggests a sharp increase” in out-of-country 
surrogate usage, particularly from India, which tend to be less expensive than surrogacy 
services in, for example, the United States). 
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The decision to go abroad for these reproductive services often 
is triggered by substantive differences in national laws.10 For 
example, surrogacy is prohibited in several European countries, 
even as a remedy for infertility,11 and is permitted but carefully 
regulated in other countries, including parts of the United 
States.12 
India’s surrogacy industry has received perhaps the most 
attention.13 The surrogacy process in India is reportedly less 
expensive than in Canada or the United States, and the industry 
is largely unregulated.14 According to research conducted by US 
journalists on one Indian clinic, a surrogate pregnancy there 
costs approximately US$12,000 (of which the surrogate mother 
may earn between US$5000 and US$7000 for her services15), as 
opposed to costs of up to US$80,000 for the same services in the 
United States.16 Other estimates put the total costs of surrogacy 
in India at US$10,000 to US$35,000 per pregnancy, and at 
US$59,000 to US$80,000 per pregnancy in the United States.17 
The trend toward surrogacy globalization and, in particular, 
toward surrogacy tourism in a few favorable—and inexpensive—
parts of the world, has raised concerns about the need to 
develop and implement measures on a global level to ensure 
                                                                                                             
9. See Lee, supra note 8, at 276–77; Scott Friedman, International Surrogacy Ripening 
in Texas, NBC DALLAS-FT. WORTH (May 13, 2010, 11:14 PM), http://www.nbcdfw.com/
news/health/International-Surrogacy-Ripening-in-Texas-93688734.html.  
10. Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 295, 299. 
11. See Margaret Ryznar, International Commercial Surrogacy and Its Parties, 43 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2010).  
12. See Smerdon, supra note 3, at 24–26. 
13. See Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1012–16. See generally Smerdon, supra note 3; 
Rimm, supra note 6. 
14. See Amrita Pande, “At Least I Am Not Sleeping with Anyone”: Resisting the Stigma of 
Commercial Surrogacy in India, 36 FEMINIST STUD. 292, 295 (2010). To date, the Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies Regulation Bill, which would provide standards for the 
surrogacy industry (albeit “friendly” ones, according to the author), and make 
surrogacy contracts binding and enforceable, has not yet been enacted into law. 
15. Smerdon, supra note 3, at 50. 
16. See Journey to Parenthood, OPRAH WINFREY SHOW (Jan. 1, 2006), 
http://www.oprah.com/world/Wombs-for-Rent.  
17. See Smerdon, supra note 3, at 32; see also Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1018–19 
(citing US$25,000 to US$30,000 as the estimated cost of Indian surrogacy, noting that 
such costs are around one-third the cost of US surrogacy, and citing US$6000 to 
US$10,000 as the amount retained by the Indian surrogate). 
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that exploitation does not occur in the industry.18 Presently, 
however, no surrogacy-specific international instrument or 
regulatory scheme exists.19 
II. ETHICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The human body is the vessel in which a person navigates 
his or her life. As such, it is commonly viewed in the legal 
context as deserving of special care and protection, particularly 
with regard to the circumstances in which it may be bought, 
sold, or rented.20 Generally speaking, however, there appears to 
be a greater tolerance for the commercialization of reproductive 
services (e.g., buying and selling gametes for reproduction or 
renting female sex organs for gestational surrogacy21) compared 
to bodily services that do not involve reproduction (e.g., 
prohibitions on buying and selling nonreproductive organs or 
renting female sex organs for nonprocreative sexual 
recreation).22 Significantly, the World Health Organization’s 
                                                                                                             
18. See Casey Humbyrd, Fair Trade International Surrogacy, 9 DEVELOPING WORLD 
BIOETHICS 111, 116 (2009); Lee, supra note 8, at 299; Angie Godwin McEwen, Note, So 
You’re Having Another Woman’s Baby: Economics and Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy, 
32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 271, 303–04 (1999). For a parallel discussion of global 
ethics, see Heather Widdows, Localized Past, Globalized Future: Towards an Effective 
Bioethical Framework Using Examples from Population Genetics and Medical Tourism, 25 
BIOETHICS 83, 84 (2011) (arguing that “effective ethical frameworks must be global” 
and must “recognize the injustices that arise in the global context,” as in the case of 
medical tourism). 
19. See Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1011. 
20. See Cynthia B. Cohen, Selling Bits and Pieces of Humans to Make Babies: The Gift 
of the Magi Revisited, 24 J. MED. & PHIL. 288, 291 (1999) (“We have no ethical qualms 
about selling other materials and procedures that are designed to save lives, such as 
respirators, oxygen tanks, intensive care services, and transplant surgery. The reason we 
are reluctant to exchange money for human kidneys is that this would deny something 
distinctly valuable about human beings—their human dignity and worth.”). 
21. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1769 (2010). 
Kimberly Krawiec notes that society tends to stigmatize “virginity sales and other sex 
work,” and“romantic[ally] recharacteriz[e] . . . a monetary transaction into an altruistic 
one, in the case of oocyte and surrogacy sales,” regardless of the difference in reaction. 
Id. She ultimately argues, however, that both reactions are an “attempt to relegate these 
taboo trades to the shadows, where they are less overt and thus less destabilizing to 
societal norms.” Id. But see Cohen, supra note 20, at 289 (“The sale of fetal eggs and 
ovaries strikes many as ethically repulsive.”). 
22. See H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Giving, Selling, and Having Taken: Conflicting 
Views of Organ Transfer, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 31, 42 (2004). But see Marsha Garrison, 
Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1648–51 (2008) (suggesting the 
use of organ transfer regulation as a model for the regulation of assisted reproductive 
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(“WHO”) Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue, and 
Organ Transplantation, which prohibit the purchase and sale of 
nonreproductive organs for transplantation purposes, explicitly 
exempt reproductive organs and tissue from their scope.23 While 
a detailed ethical analysis of this dichotomy is beyond the scope 
of this Article, it is helpful to recognize that such a divergence of 
views may exist. This recognition is particularly useful when 
analyzing the regulation of gestational surrogacy in light of 
regulation pertaining to other uses of the human body.24 
A. Gender and Poverty in Surrogacy 
At the outset, many of the concerns surrounding 
gestational surrogacy appear to mirror those surrounding sex 
work, particularly with regard to gender-based disparities.25 As 
with sex work, the surrogacy debate disproportionately impacts 
women. In the case of surrogacy, however, the disproportionate 
impact is due largely to the biological reality that only women 
can be gestational surrogates and that the demand for female 
body parts, namely the eggs and womb, cannot be met by any 
                                                                                                             
technology). However, Marsha Garrison also offers an interesting analysis of the 
differences between reproductive tissues and nonreproductive tissues and their 
treatment in US law, particularly in the context of her arguments in favor of regulating 
the industry. Id. at 1651–55; see also Rimm, supra note 6, at 1450 (acknowledging 
comparisons between prostitution and surrogacy but noting the “fundamental[] 
differen[ce]” in the use of the woman’s body in each scenario). 
23. World Health Organization, WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and 
Organ Transplantation, ¶ 4, WHO Doc. EB 123/5 (May 2008) (“The Guiding Principles 
do not apply to transplantation of gametes, ovarian or testicular tissue, or embryos for 
reproductive purposes, or to blood or blood constituents collected for transfusion 
purposes.”). 
24. One legal commentator, Margaret Ryznar, noted succinctly: “Interestingly, 
while most legal systems around the world have sought to uniformly outlaw or heavily 
regulate other markets wherein humans or their parts are bought and sold—including 
human trafficking, embryo trafficking, prostitution, and internal organ selling—they 
have not yet done so with surrogacy.” Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1011. 
25. See, e.g., Donchin, supra note 7, at 324 (discussing issues of gender in the sex 
work and surrogacy contexts). But cf. Jean M. Sera, Surrogacy and Prostitution: A 
Comparative Analysis, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 315, 316 (1997). Other scholars focus less 
explicitly on gender issues and more generally on exploitation concerns. See, e.g., 
Jennifer Damelio & Kelly Sorensen, Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy, 22 
BIOETHICS 269, 270 (2008) (“The prostitution argument is sensitive in some ways to the 
gestational surrogate’s vulnerability; but it’s somewhat off target.”); Rimm, supra note 
6, at 1443 (“Opponents of surrogacy liken these arrangements to prostitution, paid 
adoptions, or organ sales.”). 
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other demographic.26 Lisa Ikemoto, a bioethics and legal 
scholar, has articulated her concerns that women would be 
systematically underprotected in surrogacy arrangements, 
stating that the “interplay between biological essentialism and 
commodification of the women who are the means to the end 
may permit a laxness in minimizing risk to those women.”27 
Indeed, because women tend to be at greater risk of being 
marginalized and exploited,28 particularly in conservative or 
poverty-stricken societies,29 there is concern that women may be 
forced against their will into lives as gestational surrogates.30 In 
addition, the lack of meaningful education and employment 
opportunities may be a powerful motivation for the provision of 
surrogacy services, resulting in women becoming surrogates out 
of necessity,31 which could perhaps lead to some women failing 
to give truly informed consent. 
Furthermore, surrogates may actually reinforce gender 
hierarchies in their attempts to resist the stigma associated with 
surrogacy.32 For example, some Indian surrogates who were 
interviewed about their work reportedly responded with an 
“emphasis on the morality of husbands, their ‘generosity’ in 
giving permission to their wives to be surrogates, and [a] striking 
absence of any narrative about surrogacy as paid work done by 
women.”33 In other instances documented in India, surrogates’ 
families “often spoke of surrogacy not as individual (woman’s) 
choice or work, but as a ‘team effort’ made by the entire family 
                                                                                                             
26. See Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 305, 307. 
27. Id. at 305. 
28. See Donchin, supra note 7, at 325–26 (discussing “the gendered cycle of 
vulnerability”); Smerdon, supra note 3, at 54 (“Indian women may be pressured by 
their families, brokers, and personal circumstances to lend their bodies for cash.”). 
29. See Donchin, supra note 7, at 325–27; Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1011; Rimm, 
supra note 6, at 1445. 
30. See Pande, supra note 14, at 301–02 (noting that some of the surrogates 
justified their decision by arguing that surrogacy was a necessity for them, not a choice 
freely made); Iris Leibowitz-Dori, Note, Womb for Rent: The Future of International Trade 
in Surrogacy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329, 330–31 (1997); see also Donchin, supra note 
7, at 326; Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1017; Rimm, supra note 6, at 1444–45. 
31. See Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 331 n.11. One scholar interviewed Indian 
surrogates and found that their education level ranged from illiteracy to a high school 
level. Their average education level was middle school. See Pande, supra note 14, at 297. 
32. Pande, supra note 14, at 303 (discussing Indian surrogates). 
33. Id. 
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to improve the members’ financial situation.”34 When 
interviewed, one father-in-law of a surrogate stated that he had 
“decided not to ‘become a surrogate’ again” due to perceived 
inequities in pay when “we delivered two babies” but “still we got 
the same rate.”35 
Poverty is another troubling element of the surrogacy 
trade.36 The potentially coercive influence of offering money for 
the sale or rental of body parts, services that do not require 
existing wealth or education, may create situations in which the 
sellers are disproportionately those who have nothing other 
than their bodies to sell.37 This risk is apparent in both the sex 
work38 and organ trafficking39 contexts. The trends in 
international surrogacy appear to support this assumption in the 
surrogacy context40 as well. In low-income countries with 
permissive regulatory standards or poor enforcement of 
surrogacy laws, it thus stands to reason that cottage industries 
and “tourist” trades are likely to become prevalent. 
                                                                                                             
34. Id. 
35. Id. (emphases added). 
36. See id. at 297 (noting that thirty-four of forty-two interviewed surrogates 
reported a family income level at or below the poverty line and that “[f]or most women 
who work as surrogates, the [US]$3000 earned is equivalent to four or five years of 
family income”); Journey to Parenthood, supra note 16 (characterizing surrogates’ 
earnings of US$5000 as approximately ten years’ worth of income); see also Rimm, supra 
note 6, at 1443–46 (examining the dangers of economic exploitation of surrogates). 
37. See, e.g., Donchin, supra note 7, at 326 (“Poverty induces people to resort to 
work that separates them from their families or jeopardizes their health. These 
conditions put pressure on women to become sex workers, surrogates or ovum 
donors. . . .”). But see Lee, supra note 8, at 276 (arguing that in the United States the 
“prevailing stereotype of [US] women who opt to become gestational surrogates is that 
they are motivated primarily by financial considerations, which is not true”). 
38. See Gergana Danailova-Trainor & Patrick Belser, Globalization and the Illicit 
Market for Human Trafficking: An Empirical Analysis of Supply and Demand 10 (Int’l Lab. 
Office, Working Paper No. 53, 2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/—-ed_norm/—-declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081931.pdf; see also 
Chi Mgbako & Laura A. Smith, Sex Work and Human Rights in Africa, 33 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1178, 1179 (2010) (“[M]any African sex workers enter the trade due to economic 
stressors . . . [which] lead African women to view sex work as an economically viable 
option for themselves and their families.”). 
39. See Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Organs Without Borders, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan.–Feb. 
2005, at 26; Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional 
Picture Based on Integration of Available Information, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 955, 
958–59 (2007). 
40. See Pande, supra note 14, at 297 (discussing the relative poverty and lack of 
education among surrogates). 
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B. Health and Human Dignity 
The link between poverty and health is well-documented.41 
However, despite their often low socioeconomic status, 
surrogates initially are in good health because the provision of 
surrogacy services depends on it.42 Furthermore, surrogates tend 
to use their earnings to lift their families out of poverty, which 
presumably improves their families’ health. As a result, the 
general association between poverty and poor health may not be 
reflected in an examination of surrogates and their families, 
with the possible exception of health-related surrogacy risks, 
discussed in detail below. Interestingly, it has been argued that 
surrogacy may have a broader negative impact on a destination 
country’s public health. For example, some commentators have 
raised the possibility that a blossoming surrogacy industry may 
drain precious health resources in developing countries.43 
Nevertheless, it is likely that many of the risks of surrogacy will 
be borne by individual surrogates as a direct result of their work. 
1. Potential Negative Impacts 
Any time that there is an exchange of money for access to 
the body or body parts, there is the risk of harm to human 
dignity.44 One risk is that poor women, who comprise a majority 
of surrogates, may begin to value themselves as the market 
values them—based on age, health history, or any other factors 
                                                                                                             
41. See Allyn L. Taylor & Karen C. Sokol, The Evolution of Global Health Law in a 
Globalized World, in 1 THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY: YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 2007, at 19, 19 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo ed., 2008) (noting that 
“income is the primary determinant of health in low income countries”). 
42. See Kalsang Bhatia et al., Surrogate Pregnancy: An Essential Guide for Clinicians, 
11 OBSTETRICIAN & GYNAECOLOGIST 49, 52 (2009); Lee, supra note 8, at 279 (discussing 
a fertility clinic requiring surrogates to be in “good health,” among other 
qualifications). 
43. See Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 302 (discussing fears of health resources going 
into private clinics that service tourists). Similar concerns arise when physicians are 
employed to take care of surrogates in the private industry when their skills could be 
used to benefit more people by providing basic healthcare in the community. See 
Rimm, supra note 6, at 1446 n.108. 
44. Some commentators believe that the commodification of the body, even for 
reproductive purposes, is so fundamentally incompatible with human dignity that it is 
“ethically unacceptable.” See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 20, at 305. 
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that cause a surrogate’s “price” to rise or fall.45 Existing cultural 
views of women as second-class citizens may further compound 
such a skewed sense of self-worth. These cultural views include 
practices that treat women as property, such as marital dowries; 
deprive them of property, such as unequal or gender-biased 
inheritance laws; or view them as burdens who are less valuable 
than their male counterparts, such as preferential feeding and 
access to education for male children, sex-selective abortion, 
and girl-child infanticide.46 Indeed, the very act of serving as a 
surrogate may be seen as stigmatizing to the surrogate and her 
family.47 Amrita Pande, a gender studies scholar who has 
interviewed and conducted ground studies of surrogacy in India, 
notes that the commercial or contractual nature of the 
surrogate’s relationships with the intended parents makes some 
surrogates uncomfortable. In some instances this discomfort 
causes surrogates, as a means of protecting their own integrity 
and self-worth, to “establish[] or imagin[e] a relationship with 
the couple hiring them,” believing in some instances that their 
“sisters” (i.e., the intended mothers) would continue to take 
care of the surrogates or the surrogates’ families, or would 
continue to involve the surrogate in the life of the contracted 
child.48 Regardless of the origin or basis for a surrogacy stigma, it 
is still a hurdle that the participating parties must overcome. 
Many of the physical risks involved in surrogacy are at least 
as serious as those involved in other contracted uses of the body, 
such as sex work or organ sales.49 Although a surrogate 
presumably will not face rape or physical abuse by those involved 
                                                                                                             
45. See Pande, supra note 14, at 305 (discussing one surrogate who believes that 
because she is college-educated and not from the Indian state of Gujarat, she has 
increased negotiating power and feels “special”). 
46. See generally GEETANJALI GANGOLI, INDIAN FEMINISMS: LAW, PATRIARCHIES AND 
VIOLENCE IN INDIA (2007) (discussing these cultural views and their impact on reform 
in India). 
47. See Pande, supra note 14, at 293 (“Women who work as gestational surrogates 
in India are engaged in a particularly stigmatized form of labor, and they do 
considerable emotional and ideological work to manage that stigma.”). But see Lee, 
supra note 8, at 280 (noting one surrogate’s comments that the stigma she faced as a 
surrogate was reduced or removed when family and friends saw her financial status 
improve as a result of her surrogacy work). 
48. Pande, supra note 14, at 306–07. 
49. See Bhatia et al., supra note 42, at 52–53 (describing the risks associated with 
surrogacy).  
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in her contracted pregnancy, she obviously risks damage to her 
health, including death, in the scope of her duties. The risks of 
pregnancy are well-known, may be life-threatening, and increase 
with the number of fetuses in the womb or number of past 
pregnancies.50 Even in the “best case scenario”—in which the 
pregnancy is uncomplicated and the baby is born healthy and 
without the need for cesarean section surgery—the surrogate 
will face the pain of labor (or, alternatively, potential 
complications from epidural administration), and may face 
physiological damage from the birthing process, infection, 
negative health effects flowing from pregnancy, such as weight 
gain, postpartum depression, and the emotional upheaval51 that 
comes with giving to others a child that one has nurtured and 
birthed. 
Surrogacy also carries with it the challenge of balancing the 
interests of the prospective parents with the interests of the 
surrogate.52 The interests of the surrogate (e.g., maintaining 
personal health, human dignity, and financial interests that can 
be met only by delivering a healthy baby) could be at odds with 
the interests of the parents (e.g., a financial interest in 
minimizing cost53 or a desire to obtain a healthy baby even at the 
                                                                                                             
50. See Susan Donaldson James, Surrogate Mom Damages Heart After Four Babies, 
ABC NEWS, Mar. 3, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/surrogate-mother-suffers-
heart-damage-giving-birth-children/story?id=13028197. 
51. See Bhatia et al., supra note 42, at 52 (suggesting counseling so that, among 
other things, the surrogate can consider anticipate the emotional “effect of parting 
with the child if the pregnancy is successful”); Lee, supra note 8, at 290. But see Bhatia 
et al., supra note 42, at 52–53 (noting that theoretical concerns about the postpartum 
mental health of the surrogate have not been borne out in clinical practice). 
52. Certainly, any child born via surrogacy also will be impacted by the parameters 
of the surrogacy arrangement. See, e.g., Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 294 (discussing the 
risks that arise from legal uncertainty over the parent-child relationships formed from 
the use of assisted reproductive technology, and noting that “[t]he child's status and 
future” also hinge on the outcome of such an issue); Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1031–35. 
However, the extent to which an unborn fetus has separate and protectable interests is 
less clear. See Knoppers, supra note 4, at 341 (noting the lack of “legal personality” of 
an embryo in vitro). 
53. Craig R. Sweet, Surrogacy: Practical Medical Aspects, AM. SURROGACY CENTER, 
INC., http://www.surrogacy.com/medres/article/aspects.html (last visited Feb. 20, 
2012) (listing the potential unexpected costs associated with surrogacy: 
Pregnancy complications costs; maternal complications; fetal complications 
such as multiple pregnancy complications; [c]osts for uterine evacuation 
procedures for spontaneous pregnancy losses; [c]osts for selective reduction 
in multi-fetal pregnancies; [c]osts for genetic amniocentesis; [c]osts for 
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expense of the health of the surrogate).54 While the abstract 
notion of making surrogates “disposable”55 may be abhorrent, 
the truth of the matter is that there will be complications 
resulting from some of the pregnancies,56 and difficult decisions 
will have to be made about whose interests should be protected. 
2. Potential Positive Impacts 
Surrogacy is perhaps unique among contracted uses of the 
body in terms of the quality of health care a service provider can 
expect to receive. In fact, it is in the interest of the prospective 
parents to protect the health of the surrogate, because it 
increases the likelihood of delivering a healthy child.57 
Therefore, unless there is a direct conflict between the health of 
the surrogate and the health of the baby—or, as perhaps may be 
more likely, a question of expensive and excellent medical care 
versus cheap and merely good or adequate medical care—
surrogates are more likely than, for example, sex workers to 
have their health needs respected and even promoted by their 
clients.58 This, indeed, is one of the ways gestational surrogacy 
may be beneficial for surrogates: despite the risks they 
undertake by agreeing to carry and deliver a child, they at least 
are likely to receive a level of medical care higher than the level 
of care their nonsurrogate peers receive.59 
                                                                                                             
termination of a genetically abnormal pregnancy (rare); [o]ngoing 
psychologic [sic] counseling costs; [m]edical complication costs (rare)). 
54. For a discussion of health-related conflicts of interests between gestational 
surrogate mother and the egg donor mother, see Bhatia et al., supra note 42, at 53. But 
see Rimm, supra note 6, at 1455–56 (acknowledging the limitations on the ability of 
commissioning parents to compel surrogates to make decisions in her interests at the 
expense of the baby). 
55. See Pande, supra note 14, at 304. 
56. Usha Rengachary Smerdon suggests that the risk of complications may 
increase due to the lack of genetic relationship between surrogate and fetus. See 
Smerdon, supra note 3, at 54.   
57. See Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 118 (arguing that “the best interests of the 
child and prospective parents match the well-being of the surrogate mother during 
pregnancy”); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1456 (noting the argument that the 
“commissioning couple’s interests are aligned with the surrogate’s own,” including 
protecting her mental and physical health). 
58. See Sera, supra note 25, at 332. 
59. See Pande, supra note 14, at 296 (observing that “most surrogates [the 
commentator saw] stayed under constant medical supervision during the last six 
months of their pregnancies”). 
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Furthermore, some argue that women’s ability to be 
surrogates and to be paid handsomely for their service may 
actually increase the surrogate’s feelings of control and self-
worth, while at the same raising the status of childbearing as a 
valued and respected process.60 In her studies, Amrita Pande 
interviewed a married, college-educated surrogate who clearly 
felt special and empowered by her role as a surrogate: she 
proudly described her desirability as a surrogate in the eyes of 
clients, and emphasized that it was she who was doing the work, 
she who would decide what to do with the money, and she who 
would decide whether a couple who “wanted [her]” was 
deserving of her services.61 Indeed, Pande found that “for some 
surrogates, the narrative of ‘being special’ [because of 
desirability as a surrogate] did more than just counter the stigma 
of being disposable mothers; it also encouraged them to take 
care of their health and think of their own needs.”62 Pande 
rightly observed: 
This ‘I am special’ narrative is particularly powerful when 
invoked by lower-class women in India, a country where sex-
selective abortions, skewed sex ratios at birth, and high 
female infanticide and mortality present compelling 
evidence of the prevalence of son preference . . . . Being 
‘special’ increases the women’s feelings of self-worth.63 
Additionally, some view surrogacy as a form of mutual 
assistance—two or more people helping each other to obtain 
what alone none of them could have obtained: a child for one 
and a better life for the other.64 While commercial gestational 
                                                                                                             
60. See, e.g., Sera, supra note 25, at 332–33. 
61. See Pande, supra note 14, at 304–06. 
62. Id. at 306. 
63. Id. at 305. 
64. See Journey to Parenthood, supra note 16 (reporting that a purchaser of 
surrogacy services in India stated: 
You have not walked in my shoes as someone who cannot have a 
child . . . . And you don’t know how it feels to not be able to pay for your 
children to go to school, to not be able to . . . take care of your 
family. . . . And we were able to come together, [the surrogate] and I, and 
give each other a life that neither of us could achieve on our own. And I just 
don’t see what’s wrong with that); 
see also Sera, supra note 25, at 332–33 (arguing that the surrogate “gives the gift of a 
child” while at the same time earning money, and noting “the inherent benefit of two 
persons from different worlds meeting in order to strike a bargain, in that both women 
can learn from each other”). 
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surrogacy may not be attributed with the same level of altruism 
as, for example, a woman carrying a child for her infertile sister 
for free,65 there is nonetheless an argument that surrogacy is a 
unique service that permits the surrogate to be honored for her 
work, and to enjoy the feeling of having helped another family.66 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REGULATING GESTATIONAL 
SURROGACY 
It is clear that surrogacy rapidly is becoming a truly 
globalized enterprise, with all the concomitant risks of disparate 
impacts on different countries. In fact, it is precisely because 
there are differing standards in different countries—leading to 
concerns about tourism and exploitation of low-income 
populations in particular—that many have called for 
international decisionmakers to become involved in the 
regulation of this industry.67 Indeed, the Special Commission on 
the Practical Operation of the Hague Convention of 29 May 
1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption noted the increasing incidence of 
international surrogacy arrangements and “recommended that 
the Hague Conference should carry out further study of the 
legal, especially private international law, issues surrounding 
international surrogacy.”68 However, as discussed in Part I, 
                                                                                                             
65. See Clark, supra note 2, at 770. 
66. See Sera, supra note 25, at 332–33. 
67. See, e.g., Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116–18 (discussing the implementation of 
fair trade principles at the international level for surrogacy regulation); Katarina 
Trimmings & Paul Beaumont, International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need for 
Legal Regulation at the International Level, 7 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 627, 633 (2011) (“It has 
been widely recognised that there is an urgent need for a multilateral, legally binding 
instrument that would establish a global, coherent and ethical practice of international 
surrogacy.”); Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 352 (identifying the Hague Convention 
on Intercountry Adoption as an instrument in which surrogacy should be included by 
“minor modifications in interpretation” involving existing language pertaining to 
adoption and trafficking in children); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1445 n.102 (citing 
Leibowitz-Dori). See generally Lee, supra note 8 (describing the lack of uniformity in 
international surrogacy regulation). 
68. Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Convention of 
29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, June 17–25, 2010, Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Special 
Commission, ¶¶ 25–26, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
adop2010concl_e.pdf; see Lauren Jade Martin, Reproductive Tourism in the Age of 
Globalization, 6 GLOBALIZATIONS 249, 260 (2009) (suggesting international surrogacy 
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ethical views on the subject of gestational surrogacy vary, and 
countries have differing views on the proper substantive content 
of surrogacy laws.69 For that reason, it seems that international 
regulation of gestational surrogacy is unlikely to occur at the 
present juncture.70 
In an attempt to fill surrogacy’s regulatory gap, some 
commentators have identified existing international instruments 
or legal frameworks that may be used to govern surrogacy.71 
Many argue that a separate instrument72—preferably with a 
human rights-based framework,73 erring on the side of 
                                                                                                             
standard-setting based on the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and 
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption); Trimmings & Beaumont, supra 
note 67, at 636–38 (describing a convention on international surrogacy based on the 
1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption). 
69. See, e.g., Smerdon, supra note 3, at 24–25 (discussing different regulatory 
standards for surrogacy in different countries). 
70. See, e.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 350; McEwen, supra note 18, at 297. 
But see Trimmings & Beaumont, supra note 67, at 635 (cautioning against an attempt to 
unify substantive rules and instead advocating for a flexible framework agreement). 
71. See, e.g., Knoppers, supra note 4, at 358 (discussing the addition of “new 
provisions to existing international human rights covenants” for human genetic or 
reproductive material); McEwen, supra note 18, at 298–304 (discussing the potential 
basis for regulation under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multilateral Enterprises 
and Social Policy, the Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the 
International Labour Organization, and the Hague Convention on Intercountry 
Adoption); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1453–62 (arguing for a labor rights “lens” through 
which surrogacy regulation should be approached; note, however, that it is not clear 
whether she limits her argument to advocating for a labor rights framework for India’s 
domestic law—as her arguments are made in the broader context of analyzing Indian 
guidelines and proposed legislation—or whether she advocates such a legal backdrop 
for international treatment of surrogacy as a matter of principle). 
72. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 68, at 260–61; Trimmings & Beaumont, supra note 
67, at 635–46 (calling for and outlining a proposed convention on gestational 
surrogacy); Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 354; Brock A. Patton, Note, Buying a 
Newborn: Globalization and the Lack of Federal Regulation of Commercial Surrogacy Contracts, 
79 UMKC L. REV. 507, 529–30 (2010) (noting that the lack of international regulation 
presents challenges and suggesting that a comprehensive US federal law or system of 
laws on the subject could be the basis for an international treaty). 
73. See, e.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 346–49 (discussing the right to 
privacy in making decisions about reproduction, the right to procreate, both for the 
self and “for the benefit of others,” and the right to make decisions about the number 
and spacing of children, the latter as articulated in the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women); Emily Stehr, Note, International 
Surrogacy Contract Regulation: National Governments’ and International Bodies’ Misguided 
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protecting the surrogate over the contracting parents,74 and 
having the utmost regard for the children born of the surrogacy 
arrangement75—would be the ideal solution. 
Reform efforts should strive for this outcome, but 
realistically it is unlikely to be achieved. This is due not only to 
the documented lack of consensus regarding substantive legal 
approaches to surrogacy, but also to the complexity of 
surrogacy.76 Surrogacy requires regulation in so many areas of 
law that any comprehensive single instrument will be unlikely to 
achieve the necessary political support. The Sections that follow 
discuss more narrowly-focused regulatory alternatives and offer 
an analysis of the political feasibility, the substantive effects, and 
the efficacy of the regulatory scheme in achieving its goals when 
using trade- and labor-focused international organization 
platforms as alternatives to an all-encompassing instrument that, 
                                                                                                             
Quests to Prevent Exploitation, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 286–87 (2012). 
Iris Leibowitz-Dori argues that procreative liberty best protects surrogates’ interests. See 
Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 346. She also posits that the surrogate must not be 
denied the opportunity to change her mind and keep the child, although this may be 
going a step too far in ignoring the interests of the contracting parents. Id. at 349. 
Indeed, a legal definition of “parent” that eliminates this conundrum (noted in the 
discussion infra Part III.A) would foreclose potential conflicts on the subject as a matter 
of law. 
74. See id. at 345 (“Although the intent behind prohibition (i.e., protecting parties 
from potential abuses) is laudable, it can be satisfied more effectively by improving the 
bargaining position of the exploited person.”); see also id. at 346–49 (providing an 
excellent discussion of examples of ways in which the surrogates’ rights should receive 
primary protection, including at virtually every decision point). See generally Ryznar, 
supra note 11 (arguing that an international framework should be child- and woman-
centric). 
75. See Clark, supra note 2, at 777 (“The primary objectives of any legislation on 
surrogacy should be, first, the protection of children from being treated as 
commodities regardless of their interests, and, secondly, the protection of women from 
being forced to surrender their children against their wishes.”); see also Smerdon, supra 
note 3, at 59–62 (discussing issues pertaining to the children born of surrogacy 
arrangements, particularly with respect to concerns about commodification). See 
generally Ryznar, supra note 11 (arguing that an international framework should be 
child- and woman-centric). 
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The type of regulatory convention 
proposed by Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont also may be a reasonable 
alternative legal framework. However, an analysis of their proposal is outside the scope 
of this Article, as the Article compares the utility and feasibility of a broad-based 
substantive agreement with a more narrowly-focused substantive agreement under the 
auspices of either the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) or the International Labour 
Organization (“ILO”). See generally Trimmings & Beaumont, supra note 67. 
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ideally, would be created under the auspices of the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
A. Substantive Challenges to Regulation 
For countries that lack substantive surrogacy regulation, 
concerns have been raised about the perils of such an industry 
being left to self-regulate.77 Some argue that regulation of 
surrogacy would help protect against abuses of surrogates (or, 
indeed, the children born of surrogate arrangements) by 
“limit[ing] profiteering activities by surrogacy intermediaries,” 
thereby “shift[ing] the return of profits to the surrogate mother 
rather than to various agents.”78 In fact, legalized surrogacy has 
been described as a form of wealth redistribution, flowing from 
rich childless couples to disadvantaged surrogates.79 Explicitly 
legalizing and regulating surrogacy would enable surrogates to 
solidify their contract rights to be compensated, thus giving 
disadvantaged and uneducated women a way to earn a good 
income, while simultaneously reinforcing the surrogates’ 
autonomy to make decisions about their own bodies.80 
Furthermore, at an international level, regulation—if properly 
structured so as to be most effective—would have the 
                                                                                                             
77. See, e.g., Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116 (“Similarly, international surrogacy is 
currently a laissez-faire or free trade system, and surrogacy arrangements are likely to 
benefit the healthcare providers, surrogacy agencies, and prospective parents at the 
expense of the surrogate mothers and their communities. This absence of regulation 
nearly ensures that a surrogate mother in a poor country has been underpaid and thus 
exploited by wealthier individuals.”); Lee, supra note 8, at 281–83. 
78. E.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 342; see also Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby 
M: International Perspectives on Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary Biological 
Mother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193, 220–21 (1996) (discussing the case of a man 
intending to run a “baby farm” with Eastern European surrogates, and stating: “As 
more individuals learn that gestational surrogacy can become a profitable investment, 
the industry could grow at an alarming rate without proper oversight. This unexpected 
and uncontrolled growth in the industry could lead to another significant problem: the 
exploitation and commercialization of women”); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1457. 
79. See, e.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 342. 
80. See id. This reasoning parallels that which is advanced by supporters of 
legalizing sex work. See, e.g., Victoria Hayes, Prostitution Policies and Sex Trafficking: 
Assessing the Use of Prostitution-Based Polices as Tools for Combating Sex Trafficking 
(Fall 2008) (unpublished paper) (on file with Chicago-Kent College of Law), available 
at www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/VHayes-final-IRPaper.pdf (providing a 
thorough discussion of the debate regarding decriminalization, legalization, and 
criminalization of prostitution, along with philosophies and theories driving those 
policy choices). 
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opportunity to ensure that the global surrogacy industry 
operates on an even plane, thus reducing the possibility of 
exploitation due to the tourist trades.81 International regulation 
is a uniquely valuable tool for combating truly international 
problems encountered when moving from one country to 
another with a surrogate or with a child born of a surrogacy 
arrangement.82 
A comprehensive surrogacy regulatory scheme would 
impact several different areas of law, both domestic and 
international.83 Such a scheme would implicate issues of family 
law, such as determinations of parenthood84 and child custody,85 
questions of default parental responsibility,86 and the boundaries 
of child welfare arrangements.87 Because of the international 
nature of the surrogacy industry, laws pertaining to adoption 
and child abduction88 also would have to be considered, along 
with immigration and citizenship laws (which are particularly 
                                                                                                             
81. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 
116–18 (arguing that a “fair trade” approach to surrogacy would help ensure benefits 
to all parties and remove the potential for exploitation); Krim, supra note 78, at 226 
(“Eventually, the United States must work with other countries to develop an 
international code of ethics to safeguard the use of [in vitro fertilization] and related 
technologies. As long as one country allows for unregulated surrogacy, the threat of 
baby trafficking and exploitation of women will exist.”). 
82. See Krim, supra note 78, at 219–20 (discussing choice of law problems in 
international surrogacy arrangements); Lee, supra note 8, at 285–86 (providing a real-
life example of such a problem). 
83. See Knoppers, supra note 4, at 346, 350–56 (discussing the various issues of 
human rights law impacting the “status, protection and uses of, and access to, human 
genetic material”). 
84. See Ikemoto, supra note 7, at 294; Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 337 n.50. 
85. See Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the 
Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional” Gestational Surrogacy 
Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 678–79 (2000) (discussing a US case in which 
state law “provide[d] that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is a 
presumed child of the (surrogate’s) marriage” and detailing the custody issues that 
ensued); see also Lee, supra note 8, at 276–77, 285–86 (addressing possible international 
ramifications of the parentage determination). 
86. See Veronica English et al., Ethics Briefings, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 205, 205 (2002). 
87. See Lee, supra note 7, at 291–92 (describing an unfit parent who had 
commissioned the birth of twins and the resulting issues surrounding it, particularly 
given the differences between US state laws). 
88. See English et al., supra note 86, at 205 (explaining child abduction and 
international law related to adoption); see also Lee, supra note 8, at 287, 291–92 
(relating adoption laws to surrogacy regulation schemes); Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 
30, at 330–37 (discussing adoption and international law). 
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significant for a global surrogacy industry).89 Furthermore, a 
comprehensive instrument would have to assess cross-cutting 
legal frameworks, such as those pertaining to abortion,90 
contracts (particularly regarding the conscionability and 
enforceability of contracts for children or access to the body),91 
trade (especially trade in services),92 labor,93 property 
(particularly regarding ownership of embryos),94 healthcare,95 
and substantive human rights (e.g., in defining and applying 
rights to reproductive and sexual freedom).96 Resolution of 
these issues at the international level would help ensure that 
both surrogates and contracting parents know their rights and 
responsibilities and are protected to the extent that the 
international community believes they need to be protected.97 It 
                                                                                                             
89. See Smerdon, supra note 3, at 62–81; Lee, supra note 8, at 285–86. 
90. See Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 348–49. 
91. See Havins & Dalessio, supra note 85, at 675–87 (detailing US state laws and 
legal cases pertaining to surrogacy); see also Clark, supra note 2, at 776–77 (criticizing 
the enforceability requirement of a draft South African surrogacy law and arguing that 
the “interests of the surrogate demand that she be given a breathing space to decide 
whether to go through with the contract”).  
92. See Christina Stephenson, Reproductive Outsourcing to India: WTO Obligations in 
the Absence of US National Legislation, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 189, 195–97 (2009). 
93. See Pande, supra note 14, at 293 (arguing that commercial surrogacy is a form 
of labor); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1450, 1453 (noting the comparison between surrogacy 
and other contracts for services, and advocating for a labor rights framework); see also 
infra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
94. See R. Alta Charo, Children by Choice: Reproductive Technologies and the Boundaries 
of Personal Autonomy, 4 NATURE CELL BIOLOGY (FERTILITY SUPP.) s23, s24 (2002); see also 
Knoppers, supra note 4, at 343–45 (arguing that determinations about human genetic 
material’s “qualification as person or property” must be made before laws can be 
enacted on the subject). 
95. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 8, at 296–97 (noting that Israel’s public healthcare 
system provides care for surrogates). 
96. See Knoppers, supra note 4, at 351–56 (discussing the right to marry and found 
a family under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
and the rights to life, privacy, and health under international law in the context of 
human genetic material); Lee, supra note 8, at 287 (noting the UK’s prohibition on 
surrogacy for “homosexual couples of either gender, non-married heterosexual 
couples, and single persons”). 
97. See Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116; Eileen Smith-Cavros, Fertility and Inequality 
Across Borders: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Globalization, 4 SOC. COMPASS 466, 474 
(2010) (noting that “[t]otal lack of regulation, however, can lead to abuse and 
negatively affect egg donors, surrogates, and traveling patients”); Patton, supra note 72, 
at 522, 529 (stating that where jurisdictions lack surrogacy regulation, the result is a 
“less predictable outcome for the parties involved in . . . custody disputes”); see also 
Patton, supra note 72, at 526 (“First, the lack of regulation may lead to the exploitation 
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also would ensure that any child born of these arrangements 
(who did not consent, but nonetheless may suffer the greatest 
impacts of all) is protected.98 Such a comprehensive approach to 
surrogacy is necessary to avoid difficult questions that, frankly, 
would remain unanswered otherwise, leaving the parties with 
high levels of risk and no recourse if problems arise. 
It is unlikely that enough countries will reach a consensus 
on all these issues to make an international surrogacy 
instrument possible in the near future. The challenges do not, 
however, end there. Even assuming an international consensus 
is achieved, decisionmakers still would have to defend their 
decisions to the citizens of their home countries. Furthermore, 
there is a high probability that a comprehensive international 
instrument would conflict—somewhere, at some point—with an 
existing body of domestic law. Broad reform of domestic law 
would be unlikely, however, given the many different areas of 
law implicated and the possibility for political backlash.  
In the face of such challenges, countries may be unwilling 
to cede the national autonomy necessary to arrive at a 
comprehensive international instrument. In addition, 
commentators have raised concerns about certain countries’ 
actions effectively controlling international organizations.99 
Thus, a large, influential country may derail instrument creation 
efforts by either refusing to sign such a broad international 
instrument, or by hesitating to adjust its domestic laws to protect 
surrogates in other countries, particularly if it felt it already was 
protecting surrogates within its own borders. Even with a 
comprehensive international instrument, there would remain a 
reasonable risk of noncompliance by individual surrogacy 
operations within countries, especially in countries with limited 
capacity for, or desire to, monitor and enforce the treaty. 
Given the serious risks to health and human rights that 
international gestational surrogacy could entail, the efficacy of 
                                                                                                             
of surrogate mothers. With no legal or regulatory framework in place to protect them, 
surrogate mothers are subject to the demands of contracting couples willing to pay.”). 
98. See Ryznar, supra note 11, at 1035 (stating that regulation of surrogacy should 
take place keeping in mind the interests of the children involved). 
99. See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 642 
(2005); see also Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 581, 584 n.31 (2005). 
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any applicable international instrument in protecting health 
and human rights is more important than even technical 
“compliance.”100 A comprehensive surrogacy instrument would 
have to cover so many issues that, in order to achieve agreement 
from all parties, the instrument probably would have very low 
legal standards with few meaningful protections in place.101 
Therefore, countries may be able to be in technical compliance, 
but to no effective avail—that is, the aforementioned surrogacy-
related harms would still occur.102 This raises further concerns 
about the potential international political and monetary capital 
that would be spent to produce a relatively toothless instrument. 
Once the international community has been moved to act on 
the surrogacy issue, it may be unlikely to do so again, and so an 
ineffective international instrument also may act as a barrier to 
future corrective action. 
With those concerns in mind, and in light of the academic 
discussion regarding the desirability of using different 
frameworks (particularly trade and labor) to approach surrogacy 
regulation, this Article now examines the feasibility of a more 
narrowly-focused instrument that could be created under either 
of two international lawmaking platforms: the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”)103 or the International Labour 
Organization (“ILO”).104 As “[international organizations] do 
not aspire to achieve the same things,”105 it makes sense that the 
use of different international organization platforms will result 
in varying levels of protection to the interested parties in the 
                                                                                                             
100. See Smerdon, supra note 3, at 82 (questioning whether international 
regulation of surrogacy could be effective, or at least more so than an outright ban); id. 
at 82 n.402 (quoting another scholar who expressed the view that human rights-based 
instruments are generally focused on articulating ideals rather than being truly 
effective). 
101. See Raustiala, supra note 99, at 610 (discussing the relationship between 
efficacy and compliance). 
102. See id. 
103. While some commentators have made observations regarding the utility and 
biases of the WTO, in particular, see Stephenson, supra note 92, at 195–208, this Article 
offers additional commentary regarding the feasibility of creating a new, human-rights-
related surrogacy instrument under its auspices. 
104. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that some commentators 
have suggested regulating surrogacy in the context of labor, and highlighting the 
potential role of the ILO). 
105. ALVAREZ, supra note 99, at 7. 
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surrogacy debate.106 The challenges to these approaches include 
(1) a lack of political will to push the boundaries of instrument 
creation into the surrogacy arena, and (2) a high risk of an 
imbalance in the protection given to various parties to a 
surrogacy arrangement. Both challenges ultimately derive from 
these two organizations’ limited scope.107 
B. Building Consensus at the International Level 
As noted previously, the major challenge to the creation 
and adoption of an international surrogacy instrument is the 
lack of international consensus regarding the ethical and legal 
issues raised by surrogacy. Particularly for issues that involve 
human rights, such as surrogacy, the results of international 
“audits” and supervision on those subjects (which may be used 
as a tool to improve compliance108) may serve as useful fodder 
for international discussion on the subject of human rights 
boundaries in the surrogacy trade.109 Indeed, at least one 
commentator has noted that one “function served by state 
reporting is to assist state parties in implementing international 
                                                                                                             
106. This is due, in part, to the substantive limitations of the platforms (i.e., the 
areas of law in which they have influence). Advocates for particular frameworks 
necessarily argue that the framework in question will succeed in protecting whichever 
party they believe deserves the highest level of protection, usually surrogates or 
children. See, e.g., Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116–18 (highlighting how “fair trade” 
regulations could protect the surrogate by limiting “mutually advantageous 
exploitation”); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1453–54 (discussing the impact of a labor rights 
framework on surrogate protection in particular and positing that such an approach 
has the potential to decrease surrogate exploitation); see also supra notes 74–75 and 
accompanying text (arguing that any stand-alone international agreement on surrogacy 
should protect the surrogate and the child). 
107. But see ALVAREZ, supra note 99, at 12–13 (calling it “shortsighted” to view 
certain organizations as “contributing only” to the substantive thrust of their charter).  
108. Allyn L. Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International 
Strategy to Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 479, 519 (1999). 
Allyn Taylor touts the use of such measures by the ILO: “The effectiveness of the ILO, 
especially in its earlier years, in utilizing supervisory mechanisms to implement 
international standards has been widely recognized, and the ILO’s supervisory 
procedures are still generally viewed as a model for the UN system.” Id. at 517–18. 
109. See id. at 531 (similarly noting that, for international instruments pertaining 
to the human genome, “[i]n promoting an auditing process for the [Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights], [the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] may well be able to enlist the 
political assistance of countries and regions that recognize the critical importance of 
harmonization of norms in this realm”). 
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commitments by triggering international assistance to solve 
domestic problems identified during the reporting process.”110 
By this mechanism, then, surrogacy, which usually is addressed 
at the domestic level, could find itself the subject of 
international publicity and, consequentially, international 
debate. 
Nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) with human 
rights or women’s rights platforms also may serve as catalysts for 
international consensus building at the international 
organizations that permit NGO involvement. Even where NGOs 
are unable to participate directly in international organizations, 
they nevertheless may have sufficient influence to raise the level 
of international discussion on the subject.111 The only challenge 
is ensuring that, once the institutional mechanisms for 
generating discussion have been used, the member countries 
are able to reach the level of consensus needed to create a 
meaningful instrument on the subject of surrogacy.112 
                                                                                                             
110. Id. at 524. 
111. See generally Cenap Çakmak, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) in the Norm Creation Process in the Field of Human Rights, 3 ALTERNATIVES: 
TURKISH J. INT’L REL. 100 (2004) (discussing the influence of nongovernmental 
organizations in the creation and implementation of human rights-related 
international instruments). 
112. For example, during discussions on the United Nations Declaration Against 
Human Cloning, a deep conflict developed between governments wishing to ban all 
forms of cloning and those that wished only to ban reproductive cloning but permit 
therapeutic cloning. See Allyn L. Taylor, Governing the Globalization of Public Health, 32 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 500, 504 (2004) (stating that the negotiation process was “stymied 
by a split between those states . . . that favor[ed] a broad-based cloning treaty that bans 
all human cloning, including therapeutic cloning, and those states that favor[ed] a 
treaty with a narrow focus on human reproductive cloning”). Compare Working Group 
of the Sixth Committee, 59th Sess., International Convention Against Human Cloning, 
¶¶ 2–3, A/C.6/59/L.2 (Sept. 29, 2004) (establishing a draft resolution on human 
cloning that would seek to impose a global ban on the cloning of human embryos, 
regardless of purpose), with Working Group of the Sixth Committee, 59th Sess., 
International Convention Against the Reproductive Cloning of Human Beings, ¶ 2, 
A/C.6/59/L.8 (Oct. 6, 2004) (calling for an international ban on human reproductive 
cloning but permitting cloning for “therapeutic” purposes). These negotiations 
ultimately resulted in the Declaration Against Human Cloning, although “it is widely 
recognized that adoption of the Declaration does not indicate that any meaningful 
consensus has been reached.” Timothy Caulfield & Barbara von Tigerstrom, 
Globalization and Biotechnology Policy: The Challenges Created by Gene Patents and Cloning 
Technologies, in 27 GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH: CHALLENGES FOR HEALTH LAW AND 
BIOETHICS 129, 140 (Belinda Bennett & George F. Tomossy eds., 2006) (citation 
omitted). 
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IV. POTENTIAL LAWMAKING RUBRICS AND PLATFORMS 
A. Trade 
When one thinks of a truly international set of standards 
that may be enforced between and among participating nations, 
the system of international trade laws springs quickly to mind. 
The WTO is the premier intergovernmental organization for 
issues of international trade. It is structured so that members 
must accept all so-called WTO-covered agreements as a single 
undertaking.113 In other words, countries are not permitted to 
be selective about which trade-related agreements they are 
bound to honor. Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, 
the WTO is well-known for its unusual authority to enforce the 
agreements within its purview. If one member state believes that 
another member state has violated a WTO-covered agreement, 
the offended member may lodge a complaint against the 
offending member, setting in motion a process of dispute 
resolution that includes formal consultations between the 
parties, an initial decision by a reviewing panel, and potentially a 
decision by the appellate body on appeal.114 The outcome of this 
process binds the parties, and sanctions may be harsh. 
As a general rule, WTO-covered agreements are designed 
to implement principles such as lowering barriers to trade, 
ensuring equal access to markets by treating all member 
countries equally, and permitting free market economies to 
operate unfettered by unnecessary intrusion.115 While many 
WTO-covered agreements pertain to trade in goods, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) has a different focus, 
                                                                                                             
113. See Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) 
(explaining the structure under which states operate in the WTO). 
114. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (laying out the 
dispute resolution procedure). 
115. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. A notable exception is the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), which 
requires that all countries put in place certain substantive laws designed to ensure 
protection of intellectual property. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
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and “distinguishes between four modes of supplying services: 
cross-border trade, consumption abroad, commercial presence, 
and presence of natural persons.”116 The GATS 
was inspired by essentially the same objectives as its 
counterpart in merchandise trade, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade []: creating a credible and reliable 
system of international trade rules; ensuring fair and 
equitable treatment of all participants (principle of non-
discrimination); stimulating economic activity through 
guaranteed policy bindings; and promoting trade and 
development through progressive liberalization.117 
In fact, at least one commentator has argued that 
commercial gestational surrogacy may be seen as a “service” 
such that the GATS could be applied to it in instances of “cross-
border surrogacy agreements.”118 This raises the issue of having 
“Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” for services—in other words, 
ensuring that Country A has to give suppliers of surrogacy 
services from Country B treatment “no less favourable” than that 
offered to Country A’s own surrogacy service providers.119 This 
would result in a lowering of barriers to the surrogacy service 
industry, which would run the risk of benefitting the 
commissioning parents at the expense of the service providers—
an unacceptable outcome in and of itself, according to many 
commentators.120 However, “[i]f we are genuinely concerned 
                                                                                                             
116. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, Coverage and 
Disciplines, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
gatsqa_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
117. Id. 
118. Stephenson, supra note 92, at 190. Christina Stephenson focuses specifically 
on US obligations and the challenges created by differing state standards for surrogacy. 
See id. Jennifer Rimm also notes, without reference to the WTO or trade law per se, that 
“[s]upporters of legalized commercial surrogacy argue that surrogacy contracts are less 
like prostitution and more like other service contracts that individuals enter into for 
purely financial reasons.” Rimm, supra note 6, at 1450. 
119. See Stephenson, supra note 92, at 202–03. 
120. See Clark, supra note 2, at 777 (“The primary objectives of any legislation on 
surrogacy should be, first, the protection of children from being treated as 
commodities . . . and, secondly, the protection of women from being forced to 
surrender their children against their wishes.”); Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 341 
(“[S]urrogacy . . . should be regulated to protect women and children.”); see also 
Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 116 (noting that the free trade system benefits other parties 
at the expense of surrogates, and suggesting the use of “fair trade” principles to correct 
the imbalance). 
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about the exploitation of women, then a policy of non-
encouragement in regard to surrogacy would seem to be 
desirable.”121 
Nevertheless, given the increasing discussion of “mission 
creep” in international organizations, particularly with regard to 
the insertion of human rights principles into discussions in 
previously unrelated platforms,122 one wonders whether the 
creation of a WTO-covered agreement relating to surrogacy 
services could be a viable alternative option to a broad-based 
United Nations undertaking. After all, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) is 
universally recognized as an anomaly in the general system of 
WTO-covered agreements because of its requirement that WTO 
members enact domestic laws with minimum standards for 
intellectual property protection.123 TRIPS nevertheless remains 
one of the most powerful WTO-covered agreements, albeit one 
of the most controversial, ostensibly due to its impacts on access 
to medicines,124 and is enforceable under WTO dispute 
                                                                                                             
121. Clark, supra note 2, at 777; see also Krim, supra note 78, at 221 (warning of the 
dangers of “uncontrolled growth” of international surrogacy in the absence of “proper 
oversight”). 
122. See Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT’L AFF. 15, 
24–25 (2001) (arguing that the WTO is “at risk” from nongovernmental organizations 
pushing the WTO to include a human rights agenda). See generally Boyan Konstantinov, 
Human Rights and the WTO: Are They Really Oil and Water?, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 317 
(2009) (discussing the relationship between the WTO and human rights); Gudrun 
Monika Zagel, WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages and Suggesting Convergence, 2 
IDLO VOICES DEV. JURISTS 1 (2005). 
123. See Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking 
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 11, 19–26 (2011); 
Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, supra note 111 (“[T]he TRIPS 
Agreement requires members to comply with certain minimum standards for the 
protection of intellectual property rights covered in it.”); see also TRIPS art. 1(1) 
(establishing a floor, but not a ceiling, for domestic international property rights in 
each member state). 
124. See Brewster, supra note 123, at 2–3 (arguing that TRIPS is “controversial” 
but has “actually provided developing countries with some benefits”); Thomas Pogge, 
Access to Medicines, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 73, 75–76 (2008) (“The TRIPS Agreement 
and its imposition are plainly unjust and will, in terms of the magnitude of harm 
caused, number among the largest human rights violations in history.”); Alan O. Sykes, 
TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
47, 49, 65–68 (2002) (arguing that TRIPS actually provides incentives for the 
development of drugs to treat diseases such as malaria). See generally OXFAM INT’L, 
PRICED OUT OF REACH: HOW WTO PATENT POLICIES WILL REDUCE ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2001), available at www.oxfam.org.uk/
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resolution mechanisms.125 We might therefore envision a 
surrogacy service instrument that, similar to TRIPS, contains 
requirements for enactment of surrogacy-specific domestic laws. 
The usual concerns about free trade principles (i.e., lower 
regulatory barriers) creating a “race to the bottom”126 would 
dissolve because of the standard-setting requirement.127 Due to 
its WTO-covered status, such an agreement would be 
enforceable against countries that have failed to meet the 
requisite standards, thus increasing the potential for 
compliance—and, if the instrument is drafted so that the legal 
standards are stringent ones, efficacy.128 
As with the notion of a broad-based UN instrument, 
however, the challenges to such a scenario arise largely as a 
function of platform-related politics. As legal scholar Boyan 
Konstantinov stated eloquently: “[The] WTO seems to lack 
visionaries to serve as catalysts of the political will.”129 
Konstantinov argues that, because an increasing number of 
WTO members are not democratic (and thus presumptively 
unsupportive of so-called human rights creep), and because the 
WTO “lacks a system on non-trade related requirements such as 
the requirement that Member States respect, protect, and fulfil 
[sic] human rights . . . the likelihood [of] incorporat[ing] 
                                                                                                             
resources/policy/health/downloads/bp04_priced.rtf; Press Release, Doctors Without 
Borders, WTO & Drugs: Will the Majority Prevail? (Nov. 11, 2001), available at 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=688&cat=press-release. 
125. TRIPS art. 64(1); DSU art. 4 n.4. 
126. See June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: 
Building Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 509, 512 (2006) (describing a “race to the bottom” as “competition in laxity by 
which jurisdictions compete to attract new industries by providing a favorable 
regulatory climate”); see also id. at 521–37 (discussing the impact of the “race to the 
bottom” on fertility tourism). 
127. See generally Humbyrd, supra note 18 (advocating a “fair trade” international 
standard for surrogacy to ensure that all parties benefit and surrogates are not 
exploited). 
128. See Raustiala, supra note 99, at 610 (addressing the relationship between 
efficacy and compliance and noting the importance of “stringency of the legal 
standard” in changing the behavioral baseline of parties). 
129. Konstantinov, supra note 122, at 337; see also, e.g., Lance Compa, International 
Labor Standards and Instruments of Recourse for Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 151, 
166–67 (1992) (noting that General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade negotiators in 
the early 1990s were unwilling to address the potential for including substantive labor 
rights in the instrument, preferring instead to focus on removing barriers to trade). 
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human rights issues [moves] farther and farther [away].”130 In 
short, it is unlikely that a surrogacy-specific, human rights-
sensitive instrument will have any hope of being proposed, 
much less drafted and implemented. 
Furthermore, even if such an instrument did have the 
political will to be created and welcomed into the WTO fold, 
there is a risk that the WTO’s touted enforcement mechanisms 
would not achieve their intended result. Dispute resolution is 
“costly and time-consuming,”131 and, while countries obviously 
would make such an investment to protect their access to 
international markets in traditional goods and services, they may 
not be as willing to spend the necessary capital when the issue is 
protecting the human rights of citizens of other countries.132 
Moreover, as is ubiquitously argued by trade and health 
commentators, the WTO panels and appellate bodies are staffed 
with international trade experts who lack the expertise to make 
decisions about what would be, in the case of surrogacy, issues of 
bioethics and substantive human rights law.133 Indeed, 
Konstantinov notes that WTO dispute settlement bodies 
frequently have “found protectionism,”134 and thus, presumably, 
                                                                                                             
130. Konstantinov, supra note 122, at 337. 
131. See Diana Tussie & Valentina Delich, Dispute Settlement Between Developing 
Countries: Argentina and Chilean Price Bands, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO 
PARTICIPATION: 45 CASE STUDIES 23, 23 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds, 2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case1_e.htm (noting that 
the WTO dispute resolution system is “accessible only to highly profitable sectors 
because participation is too costly and time consuming”). 
132. Furthermore, a contracting parent who is able to contract for a child on 
terms more advantageous to himself due to a foreign country’s lack of creation or 
enforcement of its own laws is hardly likely to petition his government to change the 
situation. 
133. See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 753, 765–66 (2002) (“[P]anelists and members of the Appellate Body are trade 
experts, not experts in human rights or labour . . . law.”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
Human Rights, Constitutionalism and the World Trade Organization: Challenges for World 
Trade Organization Jurisprudence and Civil Society, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 633, 636 (2006) 
(“[T]rade diplomats in the WTO have neither a mandate nor the expertise to discuss 
human rights.”); Zagel, supra note 122, at 35, 36 (noting “Dispute Settlement 
institutions’ lack of expertise on human rights issues,” but suggesting that it may be 
possible to solve that problem “by integrating human rights experts to examine the 
case from a human rights perspective”); Lisa Hird Chung, Note, Free Trade in Human 
Reproductive Cells: A Solution to Procreative Tourism and the Unregulated Internet, 15 MINN. 
J. INT’L L. 263, 295–96 (2006) (discussing WTO concerns in the context of gametes). 
134. Konstantinov, supra note 122, at 325. 
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required a lowering of existing barriers to trade (some of which 
may have been argued to be an exception, for example, to 
protect the public’s health under Article XX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade135). However, an institutional 
bias toward free trade leaves an unacceptable risk of exploitation 
for those involved in the surrogacy “trade.”136 
B. Labor 
As legalized surrogacy is, indeed, paid labor (in the truest 
sense of the word),137 it is unsurprising that commentators have 
argued for the use of labor law or labor rights frameworks to 
address the substantive challenges of surrogacy regulation.138 In 
an endeavor to advance the practical discussion of international 
surrogacy regulation, then, the next logical platform to 
investigate is that of the ILO.139 Simply stated, “[t]he ILO is the 
                                                                                                             
135. Id. at 328–29. 
136. See Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 118 (“The absence of regulations has created 
a market that is free but not fair, providing fertile ground for unjust and exploitative 
practices.”). As a logical matter, however, commentators who have called for 
international regulation—or, indeed, any regulation at all—necessarily argue that a 
lack of regulation, which is the ultimate “free trade” scenario, results in too much risk 
for the parties involved in surrogacy. See, e.g., id. at 115–16; Lee, supra note 8, at 281–
83. 
137. Many commentators recognize (implicitly or explicitly) surrogacy as labor. 
See, e.g., Damelio & Sorensen, supra note 25, at 271 (“Surrogacy is more like the case of 
being paid for the service. The contracting couple does not gain a right to do whatever 
they please with the woman’s body while she carries the child. The most they can do is 
ask that she do with her body what she agreed to do in the contract. In surrogacy, then, 
a woman is not ‘selling her body’ but being compensated for her services.”); Humbyrd, 
supra note 18, at 112 (comparing the risks of surrogacy to those in other workplaces in 
developing countries); Pande, supra note 14, at 293 (“[C]ommercial surrogacy is a 
form of labor.”).  
138. See, e.g., Humbyrd, supra note 18, at 117–18 (arguing for “fair trade”-type 
regulations, including laws governing working conditions); McEwen, supra note 18, at 
300–01 (discussing the application of existing ILO frameworks and instruments to the 
problem of surrogacy regulation); Rimm, supra note 6, at 1453–54 (advocating for a 
“labor rights” regulatory framework for surrogacy). 
139. See Ilse L. Feitshans, Is There a Human Right to Reproductive Health?, 8 TEX. J. 
WOMEN & L. 93, 119–26 (1998) (discussing the ILO’s role in articulating human rights 
and suggesting its utility for protecting a right to reproductive health for female 
workers); McEwen, supra note 18, at 300–01 (discussing existing ILO instruments that 
may be useful in regulating surrogacy). Ilse Feitshans uses the ILO as an example of an 
organization whose policies and instruments support the existence of a right to 
reproductive health that must be protected as part of workers’ occupational health. See 
Feitshans, supra, at 119–26. While her article does not appear to contemplate or analyze 
the creation of a surrogacy-specific instrument under the auspices of the ILO, she 
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international organization responsible for drawing up and 
overseeing international labour standards.”140 In general, the 
ILO promotes such values as equality, decent work, and good 
and safe working conditions for all laborers.141 Indeed, the ILO’s 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multilateral 
Enterprises and Social Policy reflects values applicable to 
international surrogacy, particularly given concerns about the 
power imbalance between, for example, poor women and the 
organizations that may wish to lure them into surrogacy 
service.142 Furthermore, the ILO’s aims and principles appear 
consistent with human rights,143 although there may be only a 
partial overlap between the human rights normally considered 
pertinent to the ILO’s mission and those considered pertinent 
to the debate on surrogacy.144 
Significantly, the ILO has a “tripartite structure” (the 
International Labour Conference, the Governing Body, and the 
International Labour Office145) that permits representatives of 
governments, employers, and workers to provide input 
regarding labor-related standards and policies.146 Thus, for any 
new surrogacy-specific standards, there is at least a theoretical 
potential that both surrogates and procurers of surrogacy 
                                                                                                             
nevertheless recognizes in her conclusion that surrogates may need special attention in 
any articulation or protection of the right to reproductive health, whether the 
articulation comes under existing laws or under new instruments. See id. at 124–25. 
140. About the ILO, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
141. See Decent Work Agenda, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/
about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
142. McEwen, supra note 18, at 300. Rimm also recognizes the problem of 
powerful, and potentially exploitative, intermediary entities, although her discussion of 
labor frameworks is a more general one and is not tied specifically to the ILO as an 
institution. Rimm, supra note 6, at 1456–59. 
143. See Zagel, supra note 122, at 6 (stating that “[h]uman rights are also to be 
understood generally to encompass not only the rights contained in the ‘International 
Bill of Rights,’ but also basic social standards, as protected by the [ILO]”); id. at 36 
(suggesting that the ILO could provide technical assistance to the WTO in making 
decisions pertaining to human rights issues in the trade context); see also McEwen, 
supra note 18, at 299–300 (discussing the right to receive fair compensation under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). 
144. But see Feitshans, supra note 139, at 119–24 (discussing the importance of the 
ILO as part of the author’s advocacy for the right to reproductive health). 
145. How the ILO Works, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-
the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
146. See id. 
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services could have a voice in the debate. The potential is 
theoretical because it is difficult to imagine that surrogates 
would unionize, or, if they did, that they would have the medical 
expertise necessary to understand and advocate for their health-
related needs. Prospective contracting parents also may not be 
likely to petition for a place in ILO’s decisionmaking process, as 
one could assume that their interest in surrogacy may be limited 
only to the gestation and birth of their own child or children. 
Despite these concerns, all parties’ interests could be 
represented via government participation in ILO discussions, 
particularly with respect to the balance of rights and protections 
each of the parties should receive. 
One substantive challenge, however, is that the particular 
work-related risks for surrogates are truly unique in the labor 
world and, one could argue, are even unique to each pregnancy. 
Furthermore, unlike most other types of employment, all the 
workplace protection in the world cannot entirely eliminate the 
risks inherent in surrogacy.147 Additionally, as most legal labor 
practices worldwide presumably lack the types of moral and 
ethical qualms inherent in the practice of surrogacy, the 
question arises whether the ILO has the institutional expertise 
to provide substantive answers to the difficult questions the 
surrogacy industry faces. There is no mechanism for 
enforcement of ILO laws, and so any surrogacy-related standard 
must be constructed to encourage effectiveness—even without 
the threat of sanctions.148 
                                                                                                             
147. It should be noted that the workplace protections for surrogates necessarily 
will differ in some respects from workplace protections for female workers in another 
field who merely wish to preserve their reproductive rights (e.g., to remain pregnant or 
to retain fertility). For example, Feitshans focuses largely on such issues as toxicity and 
disease in the workplace and “protective reassignment” of pregnant women to avoid 
workplace hazards. See Feitshans, supra note 139, at 95, 100–01, 105–08, 110. While 
protection of surrogates from toxic chemicals and disease certainly is important, a 
surrogacy-specific agreement under the ILO would need to address additional 
fundamental issues that would help protect rights other than simply reproductive 
rights, or the right to preserve fertility and protect against fetal damage. The fact that 
surrogates’ actual work is the pregnancy will require considerably more attention to the 
nature and extent of permissible work contracts, the ability of the surrogate and/or the 
contracting parents to make decisions regarding the appropriate level of medical care, 
et cetera. 
148. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 579, 607 (2005) (noting that the ILO has no enforcement mechanism beyond some 
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On balance, an ILO-based instrument would appear to 
favor surrogates149 because of both its institutional purpose in 
protecting labor rights and its commitment to fundamental 
human rights. After all, in the eyes of the international 
community, this is likely to be an acceptable imbalance in the 
recognition and protection of surrogates’ rights vis-à-vis the 
rights of the contracting parents. An ILO-based instrument 
certainly would contrast favorably with a free-trade-based 
instrument, in which the imbalance would benefit the 
contracting parents.150 Nevertheless, the relatively limited scope 
of the ILO’s mandate might risk excluding the children born of 
surrogacy from protection as well as ignoring some of the truly 
international legal barriers to consistent treatment, such as 
immigration and citizenship laws. However, while piecemeal 
regulation of surrogacy is a risky proposition, due to the 
interrelated nature of the pertinent legal issues, the potential for 
disproportionate protections of one party over another, and the 
concern that political will may last long enough to create only 
one surrogacy-related instrument from whole cloth, it remains 
possible that some of the children’s interests could be protected 
by minor changes to existing instruments.151 Should a global 
consensus be reached about the substantive boundaries of 
ethical international surrogacy, such an “ILO plus” plan may be 
a feasible solution. 
                                                                                                             
monitoring procedures). But see Feitshans, supra note 139, at 123–24 (suggesting the 
utility of ILO reporting mechanisms and “public shaming” in ILO’s successes). 
149. This argument is made by proponents of a labor-based framework for 
regulating surrogacy, regardless of national or international scope, or choice of 
lawmaking platform. See, e.g., Feitshans, supra note 139, at 119–26 (discussing ILO’s 
role in supporting a right to reproductive health); McEwen, supra note 18, at 300–01 
(discussing the benefits to surrogates under an application of the ILO’s Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multilateral Enterprises and Social Policy); 
Rimm, supra note 6, at 1454–61 (focusing on protecting surrogates). 
150. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text (describing how 
implementing a WTO-based instrument likely would likely lower barriers to the 
industry so that the contracting parents would benefit at the expense of the service 
providers). 
151.  See, e.g., Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 30, at 350–54 (discussing the possible 
inclusion of surrogacy in the Convention on Intercountry Adoption and in the Hague 
Convention). 
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CONCLUSION 
In sum, while a broad-based instrument governing 
surrogacy is ideal, it is unlikely to succeed because of the 
political barriers inherent in such a massive undertaking. The 
international community has several mechanisms by which it 
could spur consensus building discussions regarding gestational 
surrogacy and, should the community achieve consensus on key 
issues, regulation under the auspices of the ILO may be a 
reasonable, if imperfect, vehicle for achieving legal uniformity in 
protecting surrogates from exploitation. 
